North Korea blew up the inter-Korean connection between the Gyeongui Line and the East Sea Line...Tensions on the Korean Peninsula rise

■ Host: Kim Sun-young Anchor
■ Telephone connection: Senior Researcher at Hongmin Unification Research Institute

* The text below may differ from the actual broadcast content, so please check the broadcast for more accurate information. Please specify [YTN NewsNOW] when quoting.

[Anchor]
Let's talk for a while by connecting the related contents with experts. I'm connected to a senior researcher at the Hongmin Institute for Unification. How are you? Yesterday, you said there was preparation for bombing, but what do you think it means when you actually blew up the inter-Korean connection road?

[Hongmin]
You can see it very symbolically. What that means is that in fact, the Gyeongui Line, the East Sea Line, and the East Sea Line closure measures in the East and West seas of the two Koreas have already been completed in the form of construction. I think the aspect of demonstrating it more clearly by mobilizing it is symbolically the leadership's strong will to cut off and express dissatisfaction with Korea's current attitude, which is a complex phenomenon.

[Anchor]
You said it has a symbolic meaning. North Korea mentioned the word fortification a while ago. It's part of this fortification work, can I see it like this?

[Hongmin] It's
right. In North Korea's announcement by taking the form of a report in the name of the general staff, he said that he would carry out fortification work with a defensive building, and that bombing would take place in the process. However, in view of these, it can be seen as the concept of completely barrier-blocking the existing main passage between the two Koreas, and then fortifying the presence of soldiers and military personnel who thoroughly prevent it.

[Anchor]
The connection road between the two Koreas actually had a very ups and downs in inter-Korean relations and a long history of efforts to improve relations. Please point out what it means historically.

[Hongmin]
The two Koreas had ups and downs, but through various consultations and practical physical work over a long period of time, the work of connecting railways and roads on both sides of the Gyeongui Line and the East Sea Line was completed through a long process. In particular, the Gyeongui Line corresponds to a very long, 171km distance from Kaesong to the Pyongyang Expressway. Then, the East Sea Line part was a very long journey from Goseong to Wonsan, connecting 107km to the north.

Therefore, it was created on the premise that the two Koreas form an economic community and act as a major artery for economic cooperation. Furthermore, it was a valuable milestone in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation not only in its historical significance but also in that it was the product of the same joint work that the two Koreas conceived and connected together. But it's more than completely self-destructive, and it's completely blown up, so it's gone into history.

[Anchor]
Currently, the South Korean military is strengthening surveillance and alertness. Is there any possibility of local provocation due to the land blast? What do you think?

[Hongmin]
It doesn't seem like the possibility is high. First of all, North Korea had already announced that it would fortify defense buildings in the East and West seas in the name of the General Staff, and even sent a phone notice to the U.S. military, so it is not a concept of suddenly doing something that did not exist and did not notify. For now, it seems that they are trying to maintain the part of doing something within the Armistice Agreement through the procedurality of notifying the U.S. military. And today, Chairman Kim Jong-un had a meeting with some of his military leaders.

[Anchor]
Are you talking about the Military Safety Council?

[Hongmin]
We had that meeting. In the past, a mechanism can be created to determine and carry out through an official military organization such as the Party Central Military Congress or a final decision-making body. If that happens, you can make a decision in this way that you will risk fighting through a decision, but today's meeting is not about that, but about receiving reports and grasping the situation. And no decision has been made to do anything additionally. Therefore, just looking at today's meeting, North Korea has no intention of escalating. And since North Korea has consistently stated that it has no intention of preemptively attacking, it should be considered that there is no possibility at this stage. And because the UNC has recently become interested in this issue and has decided to investigate it again or look into it, in some ways, it's the U.S. intervention, rather than the U.S. If this phase of investigation takes place at the level of the Armistice Agreement, I think it will focus on the investigation rather than additional provocations or tensions.

[Anchor]
North Korea recently put barbed wire fence around the front area. Was the bombing of the inter-Korean road improvised this time? Or is it a plan that was prepared step by step from before with an iron fence?

[Hongmin]
Under the stance of completely separating the entire South and North Korea into two countries, it seems that the barrier was basically planned. It's a very large-scale work accordingly. Since it is difficult to completely barrier the 250-kilometer border area itself, the places that the two Koreas used as major passages will be blocked first. And it seems to have been carried out with a plan to block it around the most important point. However, the question of whether the barrier itself should be achieved through the form of bombing seems to be a matter of another dimension.

In the past, when North Korea made a pilot withdrawal of GPs after the September 19 military agreement, it borrowed the type of explosion, even though it was also a small structure. The reason for borrowing the format of the bombing was not that it needed to be actually detonated, but that it showed respect for the September 19 military agreement, such as the withdrawal of the GP, and the willingness to implement the September 19 military agreement. Therefore, I think North Korea's bombing format was also directed in the form of a performance by expressing its willingness to cut off and its dissatisfaction with South Korea recently.

[Anchor]
Do you think North Korea will declare fortification, put barbed wire fences, blew up inter-Korean roads, and promote such things internally to North Koreans? What do you think?

[Hongmin]
North Korea has been continuing to report these news in stages recently in an effort to gain traction with the people of North Korea about the leadership's choice of the two countries and its path, internally. That's why it's very likely to report on issues related to drones in Korea and these things that express disconnection and closure the most strongly.

[Anchor]
As mentioned earlier today, Chairman Kim Jong-un convened a consultative meeting on defense and safety. North Korean media said Chairman Kim expressed a strong stance, but it is not known in detail what was revealed. What details can be considered to have come out of this council?

[Hongmin]
First of all, we can infer from the faces of those who attended. And the report was also briefly introduced. First of all, because Cho Chun-ryong, the head of the military industry department of the Tang, was present, the drone invaded and the airspace was opened, so the anti-aircraft network was completely opened. So, the anti-aircraft systems, weapons, maybe you've been briefed on the situation related to it and you've got a certain anti-aircraft weapon system to improve it, and if you use the same means, the so-called drone, you're going to get punished, or if you get retaliated, you're going to get the main idea of what kind of drone system you can attack. It seems that the reprimand for that was probably followed.

On the other hand, the National Security Award took place. In our way, the National Security Award corresponds to the National Intelligence Service, and among the South Korean departments, the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the National Security Award form two pillars. So it appears that they may have reprimanded or received reports on how the drone came in, intelligence on it, information on it. In the case of

and the Reconnaissance General Bureau, they would have been briefed on how to approach the inter-Korean disconnection, so-called blocking of land and railways, or instructing them to work on it. Therefore, ordering something strongly may mean that you should take provocative actions in the future offensively against the South, but rather than that, since various vulnerabilities have been revealed internally in terms of future countermeasures, I think these areas were probably discussed mainly on how to establish the vulnerability as countermeasures in the future.

[Anchor]
It seems that the claim of infiltration of drones continues to be so hot that North Korea even directly steps up to Kim Yo Jong. This is also one of the justifications for hostile inter-Korean relations, can we see it like this?

[Hongmin]
Of course, that could be a side purpose. That's probably what the essence is. They experienced the shock of the highest dignity and the safety of these people, such as their capital Pyongyang, a very important holy place, or a very important dignity. From that point of view, Kim Yo-jong is a rousing mechanism. In June 2020, there was a series of processes in which the South Korean government was strongly dissatisfied with the South Korean government's failure to stop the North Korean squadron, and the party convened a central military committee on it and blew up the inter-Korean joint liaison office as a retribution. The person who led the process is Kim Yo Jong.

If you look at what Kim Yo-jong did at the time, he was very emotional in the early days and showed an attitude to respond to it. It's a kind of performance that mobilizes military action and consequently shows one's own retribution. I showed you a blasting performance. So, since Kim Yo-jong is in charge of overseeing South Korea and the U.S., it is possible to think that such an angry mechanism that expresses such supreme dignity and anger over touching the capital, Pyongyang, is working considerably.

[Anchor]
What many wondered about the drone incident is that many people have questions about whether the sky over Pyongyang can be penetrated so easily. How do you see that?

[Hongmin]
Anti-aircraft guns are very concentrated in Pyongyang. It's the most dense in all of North Korea, and it's rare that a city in the world has such a dense air defense network. Therefore, the anti-aircraft system is well equipped, and because of its characteristics as a drone, the existing anti-aircraft system was virtually powerless. Because as you all know, drones are now acting as a great variable on the battlefield in Ukraine and are used as great weapons on the battlefield in the Middle East. As such, physical systems that can prevent them are not yet fully developed because they are too small and small to detect and respond to, worldwide. Therefore, no matter how many anti-aircraft missile systems North Korea has, it would have been very difficult to intercept or counter them by reflecting the characteristics of drones on its own. Recently, the Ministry of National Defense and the United States are in the process of developing various advanced specifications, such as disabling Jaemin technology or communication, or shooting and dropping direct energy other than direct fire. For this reason, I wonder if North Korea has been penetrated quite helplessly because it does not have such a high-tech weapon system.

[Anchor]
Vice Minister Kim Yo-jong said this himself. It's not the private sector, it's the military. We all know that the South Korean military infiltrated drones. I made such a strong argument, but I don't provide clear evidence accordingly. What do you see inside North Korea?

[Hongmin]
Rather than evidence, it would be right to see it as a concept that solidifies psychosis into conviction. So you need to secure a fuselage to have completely corroborating evidence. We need to secure a drone fuselage or at least have traces of it, but without securing it, we only have one photograph taken with a laceration camera faintly. That's why Korea continues to doubt its strategic ambiguity when it can't be determined, and I think it's moving toward a way of driving itself to the main culprit, with some kind of outrage over the various remarks coming from Korea.

[Anchor]
First of all, North Korea is advocating a break in inter-Korean relations and a hostile two-state, and not long ago, there was talk of a constitutional amendment at the Supreme People's Assembly, but is it not clear whether the unification phrase has been deleted or not?

[Hongmin]
That's right. I don't think it was a meeting to revise the Constitution completely and include what we expected or what North Korea predicted. This time, this series of very sweeping revisions that deny unification internally, deny national relations, and completely sever inter-Korean relations should have some kind of internal persuasion. For nearly 70 years, North Koreans have thought of unification as a basis or connection to important inter-Korean relations, and on the other hand, there is a lot of brainwashing about the nation. Changing this overnight can have quite a lot of impact. So, I think that after some of the internal persuasion work is carried out in stages, the overall timing after the U.S. presidential election next year will be taken in the form of a constitutional amendment at a level that can be absorbed.

[Anchor]
Once again, to share the breaking news, North Korea blew up the Gyeongui Line and the East Sea Line inter-Korean thermal road today. Breaking news has been heard that some sections north of the Military Demarcation War have been bombed. Our military is on high alert. Are you now figuring out exactly which point around the Military Demarcation Line?

[Hongmin]
It's completely identified. It seems that the military authorities were already anticipating the situation by visually identifying the preliminary signs. So, the point where the Gyeongui Line is connected and the point where the East Sea Line is connected is connected to the south by connecting to the MDL of the armistice line through Kaesong and Goseong, respectively. So it's not a situation where you can't identify the location or anything like that. The location is specified in a very detailed manner.

[Anchor]
However, in one sense, Chairman Kim Jong-un has recently put forward the content that he can also delete the provisions of unification, a hostile two-state, and in a way, the inter-Korean connection road can also be a legacy of his predecessor, right? What does it mean to detonate this?

[Hongmin]
Kim Jong-un is, in fact, pragmatic in a good way, and in some ways, has the characteristic of operating policies at a very practical level. What this means is that even if it is said to be a predecessor's legacy or a policy achievement, it clearly shows a pattern of disconnection if it does not fit the situation of one's time or national relations of one's time. That's how much I tend to focus more on the interests that face my own interests. It seems that it has a large part of the practicality and practicality that can be boldly cut off from the legacy of the past. Therefore, in the process of on-site guidance of the Geumgangsan Tourism District around October 2019, inter-Korean exchange and cooperation were achieved by the wrong judgment of the previous generation, and economic cooperation was achieved. As a result, many harmful effects have emerged. So, no matter how much the predecessors agreed and achieved, if it doesn't suit them in the present era, they show a pattern of daring to cut off the land rail on the East-West Sea Line.

[Anchor]
It seems that he does not follow his father and grandfather unconditionally, but rather values practicality. That's what they said. Lastly, please point out this part as well. As part of the fortification work, North Korea even blew up North and South roads. With the U.S. presidential election just around the corner, the possibility of additional provocations continues to be mentioned. What can we expect?

[Hongmin]
Basically, it depends on the category of provocation you see. It is highly likely that North Korea's previous weapons tests and tests to put them into practice will take place during the remaining period, ahead of the presidential election and after the presidential election. Because lastly, we can do that to make the achievements we need to achieve this year more finally. In addition, it seems that there is a high possibility of actually refraining from going to the level of military provocations or aggression. This, of course, includes nuclear tests. What that means is that in the presidential election, there is a very high possibility that the U.S. will not benefit much from expressing this with aggression that is forced to provoke the U.S. in instilling its will or message. And recently, North Korea has been taking various internal actions to support Russia internally, and internally, there are many difficult aspects in this regard, such as the economy. Therefore, it seems that there is a lot of concern internally about creating tension equivalent to the current state of war. So they don't attack first continuously. The reason why we continue to say that we have no will to unify the armed forces seems to be showing our intention not to do something preemptively.

[Anchor]
Anyway, we looked at North Korea's movement, which is accelerating the complete disconnection between the two Koreas. I was a senior researcher at the Hongmin Institute for Unification. Thank you for talking with me today.