[News UP] 'Sending troops to Russia' North Korean troops gather in Kursk...Almost fielded?

■ Host: Anchor Yoon Jae-hee
■ Video Broadcasting: Senior Researcher at Hongmin Unification Research Institute

* The text below may differ from the actual broadcast content, so please check the broadcast for more accurate information. Please specify [YTN News UP] when quoting.

[Anchor]
Let's take a closer look at the relevant information. I'm connected to a senior researcher at the Hongmin Unification Research Institute. How are you, Commissioner?

[Hongmin]
Hello,

[Anchor]
Foreign media reported that North Korean soldiers sent to Russia are gathering in the battleground city of Kursk. Should I say that the actual battle is imminent? [Hongmin] The possibility is very high. These reports were confirmed through the New York Times on the 25th. The New York Times reportedly confirmed it through the mouth of a senior U.S. official as well as a senior Ukrainian intelligence official. So it's probably a cross-check of the information on both sides, so the possibility of an imminent theory is very high. As you all know, Kursk is Russian territory. But by August 6th, Ukraine actually takes over. So from Russia's point of view, this is a very important area where the Russians have to retreat and re-occupy it, and it's the most battleground at the moment. So from Russia's point of view, there may be quite a lot of intentions to quickly capture this part through the input of the North Korean military, which seems to be the case.

[Anchor]
Then, will the North Korean military be directly put into the front line in Kursk? Or do you want me to take charge of the rear support? What role do you think it will play?

[Hongmin]
First of all, we still have to wait and see, but the important thing is what was the main existing role of the North Korean military. These are the main forces belonging to the Special Operations Force, especially the Storm Corps. Their main roles are to put them in the rear of the enemy's camp and perform major facilities, factors, and various tasks. So whether they simply stop at the level of supporting the operation from the rear, or supporting the operation, there may be parts that go deep into the enemy camp and play a special role whenever necessary, but it may simply serve as an indirect support for the Russian forces from the rear. However, considering the basic characteristics of storm troops and special operations forces, it cannot be ruled out that they are directly put into the front line and act as combat agents in full. And if you look at Kursk's status as it is now and the nature of the battle, you can think that the possibility of direct front-line deployment is probably higher.

[Anchor]
The NIS predicted that about 10,000 troops would be dispatched by December, but some observers say it is not certain that additional troops will be dispatched. What do you think?

[Hongmin]
North Korea's dispatch of troops was discovered in the form of early signs, and the entire process was already exposed to the media before the actual deployment of the front line. So there is a possibility that Russia or North Korea will also be under considerable pressure. This is because the international community is paying attention to it like this. This is simply a matter of violation of international law, but basically it means that the overall contents of too much power are disclosed and exposed. So it can be quite burdensome, and it is not yet possible to judge whether the North Korean military can have a really meaningful effect on the charter and whether it has that much practicality when the parts that Russia and North Korea cannot predict are really put into the front line. Therefore, from North Korea and Russia's point of view, it is possible to decide whether additional input is needed or as significant as additional input is needed according to the adaptation pattern.

[Anchor]
In the midst of this, the person in charge of the dispatched North Korean troops has been revealed. It means that Kim Young-bok was at the top of the list of North Korean military officials obtained by the Ukrainian military. Chairman Kim Jong-un's closest aide to the military?

[Hongmin]
That's right. In fact, the Korean intelligence authorities and here are also aware of some, but little personal information about Kim Young-bok is known in the information that has been released in general. However, if we infer or infer information from various intelligence authorities to some extent, the 11th Corps was the existing name before it was changed to the name of the 11th Corps, the so-called Special Operations Force. The 11th Corps is known as the Storm Corps and is known as a special warfare unit. It is commonly known that it consists of the best agents. It is generally known that the capabilities of these troops are relatively far superior to other general local forces. He is known to have served as the commander of the corps here. And the promotion speed is very significantly fast.

In April 2004, he was promoted to the rank of major general, and on April 15, 2017, he skipped the brigadier general and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. This is also a promotion to the commander-in-chief order. As such, it is very likely that Chairman Kim Jong-un has considerable trust. And after that, he's very successful. In 2016, as the head of the 11th Army, Kim Jong-un was very present next to him several times, and the 7th Party Congress was held. At the 7th Party Congress in 2016, he is elected as a member of the Party Central Committee. As you all know, the members of the Party Central Committee have entered the executive camp, which is the core of the 250 members. Then, during the 8th Party Congress in 2021, he was also re-elected as a member of the party's central committee, continuing to maintain his considerable status in the party's central committee.

And in 2021, he finally entered the General Staff and served as the director of the 2nd Combat Training Bureau. After that, he served as the deputy chief of staff, and in fact, he can be considered a special operational commander in the military. So the image of being seen as the best position when it comes to operating special forces and being favored by Kim Jong-un was the most noticeable this year. This year, Chairman Kim Jong-un reported various training situations by his side and close aides every time he visited a shooting drill or a training base for various special operations purposes in the western part of the country, so it is probably safe for us to classify him as a closest aide.

[Anchor]
Then, what does it mean to send a person favored by Kim Jong-un to the battlefield?

[Hongmin]
I think we can look at the meaning in two main ways. One is that North Korean troops sent now are likely to be basically commanded by Russian forces. As such, if you enter the actual battle area of the front line, you will have no choice but to be under the command of the Russian military, especially as you all know, if you look at the situations in which you changed to Russian military uniforms, it seems that you have the premise that you are basically under the command of the Russian military. Therefore, it is not very likely that Kim Young-bok will actually enter and command the North Korean military with a separate command line. Therefore, it seems that Kim Young-bok may primarily play a role in collecting various information and data on the field and understanding how much combat troops, especially special operation forces, are in battle. Another possibility is that if you have a little bit of rear, a little bit of rear base in Kursk, rather than a little bit of a real force that's going directly into the battlefield, but you can't rule out the possibility that you have the overall command of the Russian military here, but you have the command of a separate stationing mission.

[Anchor]
In the meantime, a manual photo of how to respond when the Ukrainian military encounters the North Korean military has been released. Of course, we don't know if it's true or not yet.Ma, what do you think about this part?

[Hongmin]
Previously, Ukraine's intelligence authorities revealed various things marked in Korean, adding to the rumors of dispatch. On that continuous line, the contents of the Ukrainian intelligence authorities released this time also seem to be information that cannot be completely ignored. First of all, it is very necessary for the Ukrainian military, which is very necessary immediately, so I think it is difficult to see this as simply fabricated evidence to announce the imminent deployment of North Korean troops. And no matter what the content itself is, the Ukrainian intelligence authorities now believe that the North Korean military will be put into action on the 27th and 28th. So, it can be said that they intentionally made various things necessary to deal with the North Korean military in preparation for an imminent battle. As such, it seems that the information that the Ukrainian intelligence authorities acquire on the spot is more vivid and likely to have a high sense of reality.

[Anchor]
A leaflet urging Ukraine to surrender its troops. They say they'll distribute this. Earlier, I distributed a video of meat side dishes, and it seems that they are actively using psychological warfare. What do you think?

[Hongmin]
That's right. So maybe this is something that the North Korean military is intentionally trying to make good use of the various situations it's in. In any case, it seems that the North Korean military is trying to see through the situations in which it had various difficulties because it was not properly distributed in a poor facility environment, and to add a psychological element that weakens psychologically by cajoling them to a certain extent. Perhaps the initial effect of the leaflets will not be significant because the battlefield environment is quite tense for North Korean soldiers who have to fight in completely foreign fields, not on the Korean Peninsula. In any case, if the battle enters a phase where it is a little longer, North Korean soldiers will become quite familiar with the battlefield and understand what the situation is, so there is virtually a possibility of psychological agitation or shaking by these leaflets. So, I think we can judge whether Ukraine's intelligence authorities are preparing for psychological warfare very properly.

[Anchor]
Let's also look at our government's moves. A government delegation is meeting with NATO today, and do you think the government's weapons support plan will be discussed?

[Hongmin]
However, in fact, weapons support has been decided right away, so there will be some parts that are difficult to be done quickly and immediately. So, even if arms support is decided, it is difficult to regard it as rapid support because there is a process for a considerable amount of time, and there is a possibility that it will be supported while looking at the situation and conditions. It's just a matter of will. If our government actively expresses its willingness to contribute to this area and NATO actively performs it, it seems that the will can be quickly confirmed. However, it seems that the various processes that this actually supports will require Korea's preparation stage and go to various routes in order to go without problems in the most international law and in many ways. It seems that NATO is likely to be very encouraged by Korea's activism. In addition, this is expected to have the effect of putting certain pressure on North Korea and Russia, which are nearing their actual deployment.

[Anchor]
The South Korea-U.S. Security Council will be held in Washington on the 30th, and what will be mentioned here?

[Hongmin]
Perhaps the U.S. is not at the stage of demanding that South Korea immediately take some action and action. As such, I think that when the U.S. finally cross-checks what kind of role the North Korean military actually plays in the field of combat and what meaning it plays in the charter, it will probably be based on how the U.S. should take an action plan, and if South Korea's cooperation is needed in the process, the procedure will probably be developed by asking for cooperation. What's important is that the presidential election in the United States is at a certain critical timing. For example, which president will be depending on the results of the U.S. presidential election? President Lee's approach to Ukraine is likely to be markedly different.

In particular, in the case of former President Trump, the Trump camp has already made a peace negotiation to end the war between Russia and Ukraine immediately, and is showing this attitude that they will end the peace negotiation immediately. On the other hand, in the Harris camp, it's hard to rule out the possibility that the approval of long-range strike missiles and other parts of the line of what President Biden is taking right now will be even tougher. So it's very likely that the approach to Ukraine will be very significantly different depending on who these two candidates will be president. Considering this variable, I think the U.S. will probably calculate what kind of cooperation is needed after the presidential election rather than taking action right now, and some very specific cooperation measures will be released after January 20 next year when the U.S. president is inaugurated.

[Anchor]
There are also concerns that if the government directly provides weapons to Ukraine, the confrontation between the two Koreas on the Korean Peninsula will spread to other countries. Some say that it is a proxy war between the two Koreas, what do you think about this?

[Hongmin]
It seems very likely that it will happen. That's why it seems necessary to have the power to control these possibilities in any form as much as possible. As I mentioned earlier, we have to judge whether it is in our favor to show excessive intervention in the early stages, but first of all, showing this will is a very important part of the power to put pressure on Russia and North Korea and break their will to participate in the war. However, it seems that the overall procedure is necessary, but it takes a considerable amount of time for the U.S. to establish a specific action plan for this and to see it.

If a specific candidate is elected through the U.S. presidential election, we also have to wait and see how the candidate prepares and deals with the issue internally before taking office in the future. We also need to see how to develop the solution to Ukraine after taking office on January 20 next year. In addition, there will be specific cooperation items that can be requested from Korea at the Korean Peninsula or at the European level. At that time, I think it is necessary for us to approach more carefully how we will respond to this and whether we will cooperate together.

[Anchor]
I see. I'll stop listening to it. I was a senior researcher at the Hongmin Institute for Unification. Thank you for talking today.