[News UP] Ukra, Russia's first hit...Is Putin taking out nuclear weapons?

■ Host: Anchor Yoon Jae-hee
■ Starring: Senior Researcher at Hongmin Unification Research Institute

* The text below may differ from the actual broadcast content, so please check the broadcast for more accurate information. Please specify [YTN News UP] when quoting.

[Anchor]
Let's take a closer look at the relevant content. I will be with Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Unification.

[Hongmin]
Hello,

[Anchor]
Ukraine hits mainland Russia a day after the U.S. authorized an attack on the use of Attacks. There was also a strong warning from Russia, but why did you decide to hit quickly?

[Hongmin]
Perhaps North Korean troops have been sent to Kursk, and there is a possibility that the situation in Kursk will change due to the effect of such dispatch in the future. Therefore, from the perspective of the U.S., there is room for a rapid transition to a peace negotiation phase after the Trump administration is established, so the goal is to keep the situation as favorable to the negotiation phase as possible without going against the current situation. In order to minimize the effectiveness of the dispatch, it is limited, but I think it is possible to think that the approval was given to use long-range strike missiles anyway.

[Anchor]
The area where the air strike was carried out is a military facility in the Russian state of Bryansk. It's a place where you store a lot of North Korean weapons?

[Hongmin]
Bryansk Oblast is a neighboring region that is attached to the west of Kursk in terms of its location. It's a border area with Ukraine, of course. Next to it is Kursk, and now in Bryansk next to Kursk, there is a facility that stores a lot of ammunition and weapons to supply to the so-called Kursk. Therefore, it is known that the target points that were attacked this time were mainly supply warehouses where ammunition supplied to Kursk was stored. I think it's generally judged that the place where the attack was going to affect the charter of Kursk. If there is not enough ammunition to supply or disruptions, Kursk's Russian offensive will inevitably weaken. It seems that the attack was made in this sense.

[Anchor]
In some foreign media, conditions were initially attached to the use of Attax on the mainland. There were also reports that it was limited to 'Kursk Province' where North Korean troops were deployed. I need to check the facts.If there were these conditions in the pushover drug, would it be possible to say that Ukraine's attack on Bryansk Oblast this time broke the U.S. conditions?

[Hongmin]
Or maybe one of the conditions that might have affected Kursk's charter under those restrictive conditions is that Bryansk could also be included. Because even if it's limited to Kursk itself, I think there were still some points that were allowed to be targeted to some extent when it came to a number of basic major supplies that could be continuously distributed to Kursk. That's why it's not possible that the United States attacked areas that it allowed but didn't. It makes me think that Bryansk would have been included as a part of allowing even places that could have direct or indirect effects on the charter of Kursk.

Of course, the restrictions here are based on the premise that peace negotiations will work unfavorably when North Korean troops are sent to Kursk and retaken, so even if they attack Bryansk as much as possible, they may have limited it to a supply warehouse or ammunition warehouse that can affect Kursk rather than killing people.

[Anchor]
In any case, they are analyzing that they attacked killing people in a way to avoid it. Now that Ukraine is the first to strike mainland Russia with Western weapons, isn't it possible that the situation could escalate if it means that the West has directly intervened in the war, as Russia has mentioned before?

[Hongmin]
There is a possibility, but there is a possibility that we will have to see a few more times how to use long-range ballistic missiles, whether it is Ukraine's Attax or to which region. If you don't see it that way, if you use a long-range ballistic missile in all directions, it would effectively be the U.S. participating in the war and the West actually intervened in it. In that case, there is a possibility that Russia will launch an all-round offensive in that name. For now, however, if it continues to be carried out in a very limited way, limited to Kursk, even if Russia interprets it as if it were to participate in the war by allowing long-range ballistic missiles, it is quite weak to attack the West or counter the United States with only limited attacks. So, wouldn't the U.S. also considerably target this point and offer limited use conditions? Therefore, I think it will be a very difficult point for Russia to affirm that it is a full-fledged Western intervention and direct participation in the war.

[Anchor]
However, coincidentally, on the day the missile was launched, President Putin signed a new nuclear doctrine revision. Anyway, isn't it possible to say that the restrictions on using nuclear weapons have been lifted?

[Hongmin]
The Doctrine contains a strong warning, not just lifting the restrictions. You can see it like this. This means that if a nuclear state attacks a nuclear state and attacks itself with conventional weapons with the support of a nuclear state, even though it is a non-nuclear state, it is also a very powerful threat and will respond to it with nuclear weapons. In fact, it can be said that it has a justification and doctrine that can respond with nuclear weapons by reflecting the current situation as it is. Already, this is also the path anticipated in the recent path that has further strengthened Russian-made nuclear bridge in 2020. As a force to curb the U.S. from participating in the war as much as possible, we will work to strongly fix and change nuclear doctrine. However, as expected, it appears that the pre-prepared doctrine was shown immediately as soon as the long-range strike missile was approved. This content is likely to put considerable pressure on the West in the end. After allowing the Attax and Long-range Strike Missiles, if Western countries offered to support it, they accepted it as a war participation and gave a strong message that they could use nuclear weapons. That is why I think it would be quite difficult for the West to easily provide similar weapons equivalent to long-range missiles.

[Anchor]
I don't think Russia, which has been attacked by the mainland, can get over this situation, what cards can we use?

[Hongmin]
From Russia's point of view, of course, if it believes that there has been no major damage in itself, it will then be confirmed to what extent Ukraine will show the level of long-range strike missiles. Perhaps in proportion to this, the Ae-Tax used by Ukraine this time is a tactical nuclear weapon possessed by North Korea. It is the same specifications as the so-called KN-24 weapon, the new tactical guided weapon. Therefore, Russia has often used North Korean missiles until recently, and there is a possibility that North Korea will use the supply of KN-24s, which are equivalent to the same model, as a card. Of course, rather than mounting a nuclear warhead on a KN-24, it will be used in the same conventional warhead format, but since North Korea's KN-24 can be supplied and used, and Russia also has it, there is a possibility that it will respond by stacking more than 300 kilos of surface-to-surface missiles of the same specification and firing them deep into Ukraine to further spread mass destruction. Beyond that, Ukraine is expanding its long-range missiles with various assets from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in addition to long-range missiles. In this case, it seems difficult to rule out the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons.

Since tactical nuclear weapons can be used in such a low-power and low-intensity format, they are completely different from strategic nuclear weapons such as mass destruction and complete destruction of large cities as in the past. Because the possibility of using it is very low, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of using some of the tactical nuclear weapons in a very sudden way to completely suppress their deterrent effect and the possibility of escalation.

[Anchor]
It seems that the war is intensifying in various ways. Wasn't Trump planning an end to the war? I'm also wondering if this is possible.

[Hongmin]
Rather, it is highly likely to argue that it is a situation that emphasizes the need for the end of the war. This will not be a major obstacle or obstacle to the next Trump administration's transition to a peace negotiation phase in particular. Rather, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of giving momentum to the phase of peace negotiations. The reason is that President-elect Trump identifies the end of the war itself as the national interest of the United States. That means that it is a realist who believes that the war itself is purely functional in the national interest, and that it is in the national interest to give the U.S. a wealthy and powerful military through reconstruction plans or military support. Therefore, it is highly likely that President Biden will criticize the decision to approve the long-range strike missile itself and maximize the instability of the escalation. Therefore, as the first step immediately after taking office, there is a possibility that the approval of long-range missiles will be canceled, the supply will be canceled, and the peace negotiation phase will be stronger. Therefore, it seems that it has become difficult to rule out the possibility of increasing the acceleration.

[Anchor]
In the meantime, President Zelensky said that Russia's dispatch of North Korean troops is now about 10,000, but it could increase to 100,000. I wonder if this is possible. If this happens, could it be a big variable in the war against Ukraine?

[Hongmin]
Of course, it is difficult to completely rule out the possibility, but I think it should be heard in consideration of the fact that the contents of the Ukraine side are always a little more exaggerated than reality. First of all, in order to dispatch additional troops, there must be a justification and situation necessary for additional dispatch, but the number of people who are estimated to have sent about 10,000 people right now is receiving considerable international criticism. in check So, if you want to send additional troops, at least something needs to be turned, expanded, or changed to a very serious state of instability in the current war in Ukraine, but there has not been a change until now.

And the other thing is, is Russia at a disadvantage in terms of this charter, not in that situation. As winter comes in now, there are aspects in which the battle itself is forced to enter a lull due to the very cold winter environment. That's why the seasonal factor is not as big as it is a time when we need to expand. And politically, since Trump is virtually about to take office as the next president, it is difficult to create additional dispatch engines when President Trump is not bent on going to peace negotiations and is likely to continue. Rather, if you say you will go to negotiations and try to go to a frozen situation, there is a possibility that you will stop supporting Ukraine.

There's also the possibility of putting pressure on them to stop supporting. If that happens, the overall situation itself is likely to enter a little bit of a lull. It's hard to have a justification for additional dispatch. However, rather than sending troops as combat troops, these parts can be possible, such as managing the charter front in the peace negotiation phase from the back or receiving support for engineering units that can do these things in the early stages, but increasing the number of combat troops to 100,000? In reality, I think this will be quite difficult for now.

[Anchor]
President Zelensky's dispatch of a special envoy, which he discussed with President Yoon on the phone, is expected to take place around next week. There will be talk of weapons support, but what does it mean for us to support weapons in the current situation?

[Hongmin]
Under the current circumstances, it is likely to be very limited in supporting weapons. What that means is that from the perspective of our government, we have to think about it even after President Trump's inauguration on January 20th. So, because we don't know how the U.S. policy will change after taking office, and we don't know how the solution to Ukraine or the action plan will change, it's very dangerous to support our weapons of killing or bolder weapons for the rest of the year. It will be very difficult to go that far because we have to bear the situation we will face if the next U.S. government's position changes. However, I think we can send consumptive supplies from the traditional related parts needed to maintain the current charter to the United States for now in the form of selling these things to the United States. However, if we send weapons of killing or weapons in earnest, wouldn't it be quite limited because it could have a quasi-war effect and there could be a risk in preparing for after Trump? I think it's going to be difficult.

[Anchor]
Let's stop here. I was a senior researcher at the Hongmin Institute for Unification. Commissioner, thank you for your words today.

[Hongmin]
Thank you.