[News UP] North Korea's 'unmanned flag incident' is a series of rude talk..."America with a dog." What's your intention?

■ Host: Anchor Yoon Jae-hee
■ Video call: Hong Min, senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Unification,

* The text below may differ from the actual broadcast content, so please check the broadcast for more accurate information. Please specify [YTN News UP] when quoting.

[Anchor]
Let me take a look at North Korea's recent moves with an expert. It is with Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Unification. Commissioner, you're out, right?

[Hongmin]
Hello,

[Anchor]
North Korea is raising its level of rude talk every day. Last night, Vice Minister Kim Yo-jong also argued that the main culprit is the South Korean military and that the U.S. should take responsibility. It's also unusual to have a conversation for three consecutive days. What do you think is the reason why you suddenly attracted the United States?

[Hongmin]
It's referred to as the United States here, but it appears that it was intended to be the United Nations Command. This means that North Korea does not actually recognize the UNC, so it is usually referred to as the U.S. military, so it can be said to refer to the UNC. In any case, the spread ladder was steep and the crisis was created, which increased the risk they had to take. That's why I think such remarks were made in the hope that the situation will be cleared up quickly through the intervention of the UN agency in order to avoid the escalation ladder as much as possible.

[Anchor]
You said it seemed to refer to the UN agency, but it is known that an investigation into North Korea's drone penetration manipulation has now begun. Can we get an accurate result?

[Hongmin]
Perhaps it will take a considerable amount of time if the investigation proceeds. I don't think this is a concept that comes to a conclusion quickly in a short period of time. This is because if the drone was actually sent and sent, the route and by whom have not yet been identified or revealed, so it seems that technical verification processes are needed for a considerable period of time to investigate these parts at the UN agency level.

Therefore, it seems that the parts used for political purposes in a way that results in a short period of time will be approached as carefully as possible. Perhaps if the actual drone crosses from the South Korean side and spreads something in the form of an operation to the North, it will be a serious violation of the armistice agreement, so there will probably be some kind of action after the UN investigation.

[Anchor]
The Russian Foreign Ministry has also said that the drone incident is a violation of North Korea's sovereignty and interference in domestic affairs. I also mentioned the comprehensive strategic relationship I signed before this, so what intention should I see Russia's move?

[Hongmin]
As you all know, North Korea and Russia have been making diplomatic supportive remarks and sympathizing with each other on some major issues as they have become diplomatically close and accelerated military cooperation. In particular, when it comes to Russia's war in Ukraine, North Korea has made quite a few offensives against the United States and NATO in the form of diplomatic remarks. On the other hand, Russia is also showing some kind of sympathy with the current issue, especially with regard to the current issue of drone invasion, by expressing diplomatic support from North Korea's point of view or from North Korea's point of view. Perhaps the part related to the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement is soon to be approved and ratified by North Korea, so Russia seems to have visualized these treaty agreements at a similar time and timing in line with this.

[Anchor]
Yesterday, the military authorities also caught the situation of attempting to blow up the southern connection road of the Donghae and Gyeongui lines. It's a situation that can be exploded right now, how are you analyzing it?

[Hongmin]
It's the 9th. On the 9th, the North Korean General Staff said in a newsletter that it would be fortifying to completely cut off the connected roads or railroads, and the existing railway and road facilities must be removed in order to fortify the construction. It seems to be preparing to detonate something in the name of that. It's a kind of show-off performance rather than a concept of technical need. Completely disconnect the connection between the two Koreas and all existing connections. We have a strong will to cut off. It's seen as a fairly symbolic performance to show the will of the leadership.

[Anchor]
Since the end of last year, North Korea has been cutting off the land between the two Koreas, so what is the North Korean regime trying to gain through such fortification?

[Hongmin]
It's on a continuous line with what I said earlier. So the leadership is trying to define inter-Korean relations as two hostile belligerents and persuade North Koreans, while firmly imprinting the will to cut off the South on the so-called South Koreans. I think it should be considered that this is all complex. In particular, internally, a kind of abandonment of unification, and then a renunciation of the disconnection of national relations.

In fact, for North Koreans who have been brainwashed for more than 70 years, it is not a concept that can be given up immediately after explaining it for a day or two. So in some ways, how strong the leadership is to boost the persuasion within the North. And it seems that it will intentionally amplify and probably message in various ways that the threat from Korea and the United States is quite large, which must be cut off like this.

[Anchor]
Will the fortification work that North Korea is talking about lead to the destruction of roads and the establishment of barbed wire in this way? Or do you see the possibility of a more different way?

[Hongmin]
And in the short term, it's going to be a very costly, time-consuming task to completely fortify and barrier this entire 250-kilometer border. Therefore, it would be very difficult for North Korea to proceed like that right away. It is expected to thoroughly block the passage of a kind of fortress base, which can completely block the passage of the area, and military presence, and if we can afford it later, we will expand such a kind of barrier in the long term, such as the barrier between East and West Germany.

[Anchor]
On the other hand, he is said to have ordered artillery units near the border to be fully prepared for the possibility of North Korea's infiltration of drones. It's called a brigade throughout the front area, how much firepower will these units have?

[Hongmin]
It is estimated that there are about 12 artillery brigades in North Korea. However, among them, eight brigades were mobilized to give preliminary operational instructions. And I expressed that I lowered my readiness for shooting. Those eight will be the corps stationed along the border. For example, the 4th Corps, 2nd Corps, 5th Corps, and 1st Corps are deployed along the armistice line from the West Sea to the East Sea. The corps has two artillery brigades in place.

So this artillery brigade can usually be divided into a multi rocket launcher brigade and a self-propelled artillery brigade. So, as you all know about the multi-launch artillery brigade, this multi-launch rocket is a multi-launch rocket. Therefore, stacking multiple tubes in a rectangular form and continuously launching simultaneously or sequentially is called a multiple rocket. It can be said that it is the multi-launch brigade that mainly deals with such weapons. As for the self-propelled artillery series, it can be seen that the self-propelled artillery brigade is in charge of weapons that send a straight distance as a kind of artillery, like K-9, which we usually talk about.

Usually, there are various caliber ranges from 122mm to 240mm multiple rocket launchers. In addition, there is a 170mm grain scatter in the self-propelled gun series. There is a 170mm Goksanpo after the name of Goksan Mountain. It can be said that this is mainly a series of self-propelled artillery deployed by North Korea. In addition, 300mm large-caliber multiple rocket launchers, which are believed to have been developed and completed by North Korea around 2014, have already been deployed, so it is highly likely that they will be in a ready firing position this time. In the case of 300mm large diameter multiple rocket launchers, the range is approximately 150km to 200km.

So, if you fire from the back of the coastal area, it can be seen as a weapon that can strike the central part of Korea. These weapons, which are related to the remaining 122mm, 240mm, or 170mm, have a range of about 15km to 50km. Therefore, if it is deployed in the front, there is a possibility that major military facilities in the metropolitan area and the borderline area will be targeted.

[Anchor]
It is also newly reported that Chairman Kim Jong-un convened a defense and safety council yesterday regarding the infiltration of drones. I wonder if it should be viewed as related to the movement of these artillery units, or if there is a possibility of preparing another large-scale provocation.

[Hongmin]
It seems to be recognized as a very serious situation. Therefore, the military leadership, especially the chief of reconnaissance, which is most essential in this situation related to South Korea, and all the military leaders related to the operation gathered. If you look at the contents, it says that it activates the deterrent of war. He expressed that he had done a significant task to operate the deterrent of war. The term war deterrence is usually used in nuclear weapons. Usually, rather than the concept of suppressing something in combat or a small local war in general, suppressing war itself can be usually expressed through nuclear weapons, and Kim Jong-un has always said that when he mentions nuclear weapons, it is a level of deterrent to war.

Therefore, we can actually interpret that the term "activation of war deterrence" suggests even the use of nuclear force beyond the so-called artillery-centered response that is currently deployed. So, in this area, the threat level has been slightly increased. I think we can interpret it this carefully.

Perhaps the UN, which will be developed later, will investigate this and produce the results of the investigation. And there are various variables to see if the drone invasion will fly away regardless of our military's will. Therefore, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that North Korea's current posture or North Korea's response will become more aggressive according to these variables. However, what North Korea has said so far has always indicated that it will not attack first if it does not take an aggressive attitude in advance, so we need to wait and see whether these parts will move to offensiveness, preemptiveness, and climb the escalation ladder higher.

[Anchor]
There are many possibilities regarding North Korea's angry drones. If you look at the picture, it doesn't seem to be the small propeller-type drone we commonly think of, and it is analyzed as a fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicle. Is this a drone that can be used by the private sector, not the military?

[Hongmin]
It's hard to say that you can't use it or not, but basically this distance is a kind of operation, so-called operation radius, and it's not often used by the private sector. Usually, when used for commercial purposes in the private sector or for other filming purposes, the range of the radius in which it is actually operated is very small. For example, in the case of delivery or shooting, it is not actually necessary to send drones from Seoul to the central region for commercial use, such as 200km or 150km, and there are not many reasons to develop it like that. That's why I rarely use it like that. Even if it is used as a fixed profit

, it is not often used as a fixed profit to the private sector by driving long distances, aiming roughly at hobbies or using them within a very close radius. These fixed profits are mainly used for military purposes. In particular, the use of drones in the Middle East and Ukraine has increased considerably recently. If you look at these, the radius of the operation is set from 120km to 150km. So, if you look at the specifications of this content, wouldn't it be a little difficult to see it for private use? And even for the private sector, do the organizations and private sectors that can send this in Korea have the ability, various technical conditions, and capital to carry out projects to send it to North Korea by injecting a lot of funding, capital, and technology? There's a side to it that is seen as quite a mystery.

Of course, it is not impossible, but it is a part that can cause considerable difficulties. Therefore, it is common to be used for military purposes. And in particular, it is necessary to keep in touch with the satellite and locate it. In addition, the actual drone body and the person controlling it have to constantly control it by setting the frequency band. It is not easy to do it in the private sector to be able to continue to go while maintaining it at a distance of more than 150 kilometers. It can be said that this is mainly used only when used for military purposes.

[Anchor]
Then, in your view, where is the likely subject to send this drone?

[Hongmin]
This is not narrowing the possibility, so if the private sector did it anyway, it would only take a lot of preparation and technology and capital to work on it for a considerable period of time, and this may be virtually impossible without various cooperation and support. This is because the South Korean military authorities can recognize the crossing when crossing the border through various equipment, and North Korea can recognize it and take various military actions, so it is a very risky task.

That is why the private sector has the capacity and purpose to spend it all at the risk of this. There are parts that need to be looked at because everything is reflected. It is hard to rule out the possibility of North Korea's self-creation. This is because North Korea has developed various types of drones, developed various so-called attack, reconnaissance, and self-destruction, and released tests earlier this year.

And when you look at the actual figure, the figure itself is so blurred that it's hard for us to identify it clearly, but there are also parts that are hard to say that it was not normally used regularly by North Korea. So, unless North Korea secures the fuselage and presents it as evidence, it is very difficult to identify it and say that either subject sent it.

[Anchor]
In any case, North Korea continues to raise the level of threat, and South Korea has also announced a strong punishment policy. It was ordered to retaliate after the preliminary action, but it was said that the Taurus live-fire training was conducted in seven years. I wonder what kind of weapon this Taurus is. Also, what do you think we need to prepare more to prepare for such threats from North Korea in the future?

[Hongmin]
Taurus is a fairly expensive piece of equipment. It's a so-called air-to-surface missile. Therefore, it is a method of hitting major targets on the ground from the air by mounting and installing them on major fighter jets. Not only is it very precise, but it is also quite destructive, so it is taken as a weapon of fear. So even though Korea is quite expensive equipment, we have this. Taking this out and conducting live fire drills shows that if actual force is used in preparation for the threat of North Korea's escalation or something like this, it will accurately strike the origin.

The so-called Korean kill chain is a major weapon used here. It's a weapon that precisely strikes the origin and attacks the Taurus, and it can be seen as actually revealing the fact of the shooting training. This is a part that North Korea can fear very much in terms of the effect of deterrence against North Korea. So, I think we can see that it has a sufficient deterrent effect. In terms of the attitude we should have in the future, it seems that message management is quite necessary to prevent strategic misunderstandings.

The military's attitude and attitude are important in some ways to emphasize strong deterrence and readiness, but it is actually most important to carefully manage the message so that the situation does not spread as much as possible and to ease tensions. The most important part of the deterrence is to prevent things from progressing. So, it seems that there should be careful message management in that area.

In order to do this, it seems very necessary to manage the message in a way that can calm the objective situation more than stimulating the other person or making a little mockery of the other person. Of course, there is nothing additional to say about that because the military clearly has various deterrence posture and response posture.

[Anchor]
I see. So far, I've been with Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Unification. Thank you for talking with me today.